European civilization largely lost its sense of direction after World War One when its humanist consensus, that promoted human betterment, collapsed into a fruitless political opposition between left and right wing extremism. This collapse is here exemplified by the breakdown in relationship between left winger Bertrand Russell and right winger D.H. Lawrence during WW1. However, the real causes of the loss of the humanist consensus are more deep-rooted, as that consensus has its roots in the Renaissance andn Enlightenment movements when (...) the influence of humanist views was at its height. By the late 19th century imperialism and militarism threatened the consensus, and the senseless slaughter of WW1 brought it to an end. The humanist consensus re-emerged post-WW2, largely through American influence, but it has declined since. To restore the consensus, it is argued here that humanism can be strengthened by dualist theory and by a process of contextualization that brings humanity to the fore. By using ‘connecting contexts’ we can open our minds to larger perspectives. In that way, we are collectively more inclined to be optimistic about our prospects. The future of humanity seems to depend on such developments in our critical thinking about ourselves. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently criticized Davidson's methodology of radical interpretation because of its apparent failure to reflect how actual interpretation is achieved. Responding to such complaints, Davidson claims that he is not interested in the empirical issues surrounding actual interpretation but instead focuses on the question of what conditions make interpretation possible. It is argued that this exchange between Fodor and Lepore on one side, and Davidson on the other, cannot be viewed simply as a naturalist reaction (...) to non-naturalist philosophical inquiry. Through a careful excavation of the hidden assumptions and commitments underlying this debate, we recognize a more serious disagreement over the intellectual obligations of naturalism; a position with a firm hold on current philosophical imaginations. In the process, we gain a new appreciation for how such commitments shape these naturalist positions, and recognize that any resolution to this specific debate will require careful attention to the divergent commitments that are its real source. (shrink)

A combination of social forces has thrown marriage into question in westernised societies at the end of the millennium. This uncertainty creates space for new ways of thinking about marriage. In this context, we examine the idea of marriage as friendship. We trace its genealogy in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor and then subject it to critical scrutiny using some of Michel de Montaigne’s ideas. We ask how applicable the ideal of higher friendship is (...) to marriage and what might be gained and lost by a synthesis of marriage and friendship. Grounding the discussion in historical sources is valuable because the topic is so little explored in the contemporary philosophical literature. This approach also allows any enduring value in these historical texts to be elicited. (shrink)

This chapter compares the authors' naturalistic approach to epistemology to that of SAE. It is argued that the theories of SAE are structurally analogous to the naturalistic approach — they have at their core a descriptive theory, and from that descriptive theory, proponents of SAE draw normative, epistemological prescriptions. The prospects for the theories of SAE overcoming the is-ought gap are not good. The chapter also argues for the superiority of Strategic Reliabilism over any extant theory of Standard Analytic Epistemology.

Berkeley is commonly regarded as an idealist whose system is saved from subjectivism only by the advent of a God more violently ex machina than the God of any other philosopher. I hope to show that this accusation rests on a misunderstanding of his central theory, a misunderstanding which gives God a place both inconsistent with his main premisses and useless in his system. I hope also to display by quotation the real Berkeley, whose theory of God's place and nature (...) is directly supported by argument and consistent with his premisses, and makes a system which, if it is less than a completely coherent philosophy, is more than an episcopal assumption. (shrink)

Psychiatric diagnosis and prognosis is fraught with important philosophical and conceptual problems. This chapter focuses on some epistemological issues and moral issues that arise in contemporary psychiatric practice. It examines various clinical and actuarial techniques for psychiatric diagnosis, ordered very loosely in terms of how "structured" or "automated" they are. The chapter makes the case for assessing psychiatric treatments with controlled experiments, raises several epistemological dangers that arise from relying on uncontrolled investigations, and considers some of the unique methodological and (...) ethical issues that arise when trying to assess talk therapy. (shrink)

This chapter introduces the three central features of the epistemological framework that guides the prescriptions of Ameliorative Psychology. It is argued that this framework offers a new way to think about applied epistemology. In particular, it suggests that there are four and only four ways for people to improve their reasoning.

This volume, which contains the 1962 lecture "Zeit und Sein," is the most important publication by Heidegger since Unterwegs zur Sprache appeared in 1959. Bearing the same title as the much discussed missing part of the first half of Sein und Zeit, "Zeit und Sein" is the best demonstration we have of how the later Heidegger carries out the program which was outlined in Sein und Zeit, i.e., how the clue which the analytic of Dasein provides--that Being is to be (...) understood in terms of time--is followed out in the later works. Heidegger explicates the temporality of Being in terms of its character as a "gift" and an epochal sending which "is" both as having been and as to come. Being as time is thus the "event of appropriation". In addition to "Zeit und Sein," Zur Sache des Denkens also contains: The notes of a seminar which Heidegger conducted at Todtnauberg in 1962 upon the "Zeit und Sein" lecture. As Professor Alfredo Guzzoni, the editor of these notes, indicates this is the only time that Heidegger has conducted a seminar on a text of his own composition. A lecture entitled "The End of Philosophy and the Problem of Thought," which was delivered at a Kierkegaard colloquium in 1964. An autobiographical description of Heidegger's growing interest in and attraction to Husserl's phenomenological method in the pre-Sein und Zeit period; this was prepared in 1963 for a Festschrift in honor of Hermann Niemeyer.--J. D. C. (shrink)

This is a fascinating book. It uses tuberculosis to look at the balance between individual liberty and the public good: the tensions created between personal liberty and social responsibility, a strong theme in all work in public health. The context is New York in the 1990s, but as Coker states, “This book uses the lens of tuberculosis control, and in particular the detention of non-infectious individuals, to examine America's response to its most vulnerable and marginalised citizens, and asks the question: (...) `is detention of non-infectious, non-compliant individuals right from ethical, legal, and public health perspectives'”. The book is divided into nine chapters. It …. (shrink)

With the publication of this translation the quality of Heidegger literature available in English takes a quantum leap forward. No book--save perhaps Otto Poeggeler's--can match Marx's for its depth of insight into Heidegger's thought. The central theme of the book is as follows. Hegel's claim to have consummated the Western "tradition" is accepted by Heidegger. The foundations of this tradition are in Greek ontology. Marx locates the classic formulation of the basic tenets of Greek ontology in the Aristotelian doctrine of (...) ousia. Being as ousia is the perduring, necessary and intelligible. The Hegelian idea of Being remains within the Aristotelian perspective because it determines Being as the unfolding of the self-same substance according to necessary law and so as to develop into a stage of maximum intelligibility. Being is more radically temporal, of course, for Hegel but this stays within the perspective of the Greek notion of eternity, because the Hegelian "substance" is relentlessly working out an eternal pattern of categories which is inscribed in its very essence, and which the Logic articulates. Heidegger's philosophy seeks to "overcome" the "tradition," and so the whole metaphysics of "substance and subject." Being is even more radically temporalized, for Heidegger does not think time on the "model" of eternity. Being as time is not the movement of the self-same through time but time itself--as Being. The necessity and lawfulness of Being, moreover, is replaced by the "play" of the "fourfold." And the radical intelligibility of Being is overcome in Heidegger's thought by the interplay of concealment and unconcealment. Finally, against the Aristotelian-Hegelian teleology Heidegger posits the hope of a "new beginning" of history whose coming to pass--by a "turn" on Being's part--can only be obscurely intimated and at best "awaited." Not the least among this book's merits is the refreshingly critical attitude of the author to Heidegger--the book he says was prompted by a reflection on Heidegger-critic Lowith's [[sic]] work on Heidegger. His criticism of Heidegger in the conclusion of this book sets out important objections which the usual commentator ignores or evades or attributes to a "fallenness" into "calculative" thinking.--J. D. C. (shrink)

This book is a valuable contribution to the growing list of works appearing in English on Heidegger. Its special merit lies in the fact that its author brings to his discussion of Heidegger a familiarity with Anglo-American analytic philosophy. The author explains Sein und Zeit in a language with which any student of analysis would be comfortable. By way of example, Schmitt refers to Heidegger's idea of fundamental ontology by noting "a reform of talk about being involves a reform of (...) talk about human beings." The book does not attempt to recap all of Sein und Zeit but provides the reader who approaches that work for the first time with the basic concepts needed. The author's basic claim is that in Sein und Zeit Heidegger is making new "conceptual recommendations" for our understanding of man and the world. This represents, Schmitt argues, a break with his earlier, pre-Sein und Zeit and Husserlian conviction of the existence of an a priori and ideal language and its "objective meanings." The whole discussion of Sein und Zeit's idea of language is more original and illuminating than anything yet to appear in English. As the title of the work indicates, the author regards Heidegger's main contribution to lie in the theory of man, and he sees the celebrated "turn" as testimony to the failure of Sein und Zeit to provide a new way of speaking about being. But even as a theory of man, Schmitt warns, Sein und Zeit is blind to the social and the communal. Schmitt's book is a challenging and illuminating introduction of Sein und Zeit for the American reader and one which no Heideggerian can afford to miss.--J. D. C. (shrink)

While this is the most recent volume to appear in the continuing work of a critical edition of Husserl's collected works, it contains Husserl's first published book, The Philosophy of Arithmetic. This is the famous study in which Husserl--under the influence of J. S. Mill and Brentano--undertook a psychologistic interpretation of the origin and validity of mathematical principles. Under the impulse of Frege's criticism, Husserl came to repudiate this view. Indeed, even without this external impetus, one suspects that the dynamics (...) of Husserl's own thought would have eventually carried him beyond such a view, for his concern even in this first book is to find a "strict" foundation for mathematics, a concern which seems to be clearly at odds with the naturalism and empiricism of the psychologistic theory. The tension between these two--the empirical and the ideal character of mathematical thinking--is reflected in the subtitle of this work: Logical and Psychological Investigations. "Part One" concerns the psychological origin of number: "Part Two" the logical roots. The editor has also included in this volume a set of "Supplementary Texts ". Among these is included the Habilitationsschrift of 1878, The Concept of Number: Psychological Analyses. The rest of this volume is made up of a set of treatises which were to be part of the planned second volume of The Philosophy of Arithmetic, which never appeared. This volume was to be concerned with such topics as the logic of signs, the a priori character of Arithmetic, the imaginary in Arithmetic, and axiomatic systems.--J. D. C. (shrink)

This is a paperback edition of a 1953 anthology of select texts upon the existence and nature of God from some fifty representative thinkers, philosophical in a broad sense, from the pharaoh Ikhnaton and Lao-Tse through the classic theologians to the recent Whitehead, Berdyaev and Rahhakrishan. To their English edition by Mr Reese, Mr Hartshorne adds a metaphysical introduction, a critical comment upon each reading and an epilogue upon the logic of Panentheism, the metaphysical position from which he selects and (...) evaluates this survey of the philosophical gamut of reply to the central religious question. Panentheism claims to be the most balanced theology in the range from static monotheism to negative atheism and, accepting the ‘realist’ metaphysic of Whitehead particularly, denies timeless supernatural perfection to God, installing Him instead in the world-process in which He and men strive co-operatively for completion by self-realisation. In this perspective the pantheism of Spinoza is praised as a partial solution and the theism of Aquinas is castigated for its blindness to surrelativism: the concept that God is wholly simple is criticised because of the relations between God and the world, while Thomas’ appeal to knowledge by analogy is charged with inverting God as subject into the role of object. In contrast to the monopolar view of a supernatural God, the dipolar metaphysic claims two main consequences. (shrink)

West takes issue with the traditional interpretation of the Apology, according to which Socrates’ conviction on charges of impiety and corruption of the young was unjust, the manner of his defense noble and beautiful, his rhetorical manner a model of straightforward simplicity and truth. West’s account bears an affinity to a more recent interpretation which holds that the politically reactionary Socrates was justly condemned for being out of tune with the progressive Athenian democracy. Yet this agreement is a superficial one. (...) While he argues that Socrates was guilty as charged, West is no simple partisan of democracy. His criticism of Socrates is based on a thorough understanding of what the original charges implied; he may be characterized as a critic of the Socratic enterprise who is himself informed by Socrates’ questions. "In order to understand Socrates, it is necessary to contradict him; those who accept what Socrates says without question will never learn the truth.". (shrink)

From the title of this volume—which resists the temptation to call Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Anaximander "pre-Socratics"—to the high quality of the translations, this book is an extended exercise in faithfulness to the text of Martin Heidegger. This is in my judgment the most successful attempt yet in the Sisyphian task of translating Heidegger’s works into English which Harper & Row has been undertaking in the past fifteen years. The volume consists in three essays on Parmenides and Heraclitus which appear together (...) and in the same order in Heidegger’s Vorträge und Aufsätze ; these are preceded by the important essay on Anaximander which is taken from Holzwege. These essays in the original German are written in the full bloom of Heidegger’s attempt to liberate language from logic and to find, not only the vocabulary, but also the grammar which is required in order to bring the matter to be thought into language. They are therefore in any strict sense untranslatable. They exist only in German, in the language in which they have come to birth. But the Krell-Capuzzi translation is as faithful an attempt as one could hope for to bring this matter into English, and so to introduce those who are coming to grips with Heidegger for the first time to a very important dimension of his thought, and to help those of us who have been at this for some time to hear these German words anew. What more can one say about a translation than that it helps one to understand the original? And that is what this volume does. (shrink)

This collection of articles by scholars from several disciplines is concerned for the most part, in one way or another, with the relation of science and values. Alasdair MacIntyre, in "Objectivity in Morality and Objectivity in Science," maintains that science is a social practice whose aim is given by the ideal of realism. Objectivity in science, according to MacIntyre, is the acceptance of certain features of the practice, including realism as its aim. Recent discussions of subjectivism and relativism in philosophy (...) of science, MacIntyre says, recapitulate the history of ethics, because the scientific community is a moral community and objectivity a moral notion. In "The Moral Psychology of Science," Stephen Toulmin discusses the aims and motives of scientists in order to refute the view that the only respectable motive for doing science is the disinterested pursuit of value-free truth. Toulmin argues that this view is a barrier to understanding that science is not value-free. (shrink)

This paper advances a novel argument that speech perception is a complex system best understood nonindividualistically and therefore that individualism fails as a general philosophical program for understanding cognition. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, I describe a "replaceability strategy", commonly deployed by individualists, in which one imagines replacing an object with an appropriate surrogate. This strategy conveys the appearance that relata can be substituted without changing the laws that hold within the domain. Second, I advance a "counterfactual test" (...) as an alternative to the replaceability strategy. Third, I show how the typical objects of cross-modal processes (in this case, auditory-visual speech perception), more clearly irreplaceable than the objects of the unimodal process examined by Burge [(1986) Individualism and psychology, The Philosophical Review, XCV, 3-45], supply a firm basis for a nonindividualist interpretation of such cases. Finally, I demonstrate that the routine violation of the individualist's Replaceability Condition occurs even in unimodal cases - so the violation of the replaceability constraint does not derive simply from the diversity of modal sources but rather from the causal complexity of psychological processes generally. The conclusion is that philosophical progress on this issue must await progress in psychology, or, at least, philosophical progress in accounting for psychological complexity--precisely the vicissitude predicted by a thoroughgoing naturalism. (shrink)

Philosophers concerned with issues of mind have been turning to the neurosciences, especially neuropsychology, for empirical guidance. While I endorse this emphasis, I find that one important neuropsychological phenomenon, blindsight appears to have been misused by some prominent philosophers. In this paper, I examine this alleged misuse by spelling out the accounts of blindsight given by Daniel Dennett and Ned Block. I attempt to show that both Dennett and Block have ignored many complications surrounding blindsight including subjects' reports of visual (...) sensations. This neglect has serious ramifications for their respective models of human consciousness which I also try to explicate. Further, by misrepresenting blindsight, these accounts serve to hamper scientific and philosophical understanding of the phenomenon and of consciousness. I conclude by sketching a model of blindsight that acknowledges these neglected details. (shrink)